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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
GOVERNING LAW 
The following statutory provisions are involved in the outcome of this appeal: Nevada 
Revised Statutes Section 339.055. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
In response to the Complaint filed by Crown Asphalt Products Company ("Crown") 
in the Third District Court, State of Utah against defendants Frehner Construction Co., Inc. 
("Frehner") and its bond surety Safeco Insurance Company of America ("Safeco"), Frehner 
and Safeco filed a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue and Memorandum in Support 
thereof asserting that Nevada Statutes require that the action between the parties be filed in 
Clark County, Nevada. (R. 21-23) The Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for 
Improper Venue included documents not attached to the Complaint, including: (1) Affidavit 
of Michael Pack (R. 36-39); (2) Revised Price Quotation (R. 41); (3) Asphalt Sales Contract 
(R. 43-44); (4) Bulk Purchase Order (R. 47-48); and (5) Contractor's Bond (R. 50-54). 
A hearing was held regarding the Motion to Dismiss on February 23, 2004 and the 
matter was taken under advisement. On March 3,2004, Judge Fratto issued a Minute Entry 
in which he stated that although "Nevada's bonding statute, in similar fashion as Utah, 
dictates the appropriate county where an action on the bond is to be prosecuted... the statute 
. . . neither preempts Utah's jurisdiction nor mandates Clark County, Nevada as the exclusive 
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court with 'jurisdiction.'" Based upon this finding, Judge Fratto denied Frehner and Safeco's 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (R. 108-109) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. Frehner has been doing business with Crown or its predecessors for 
approximately 20 years. Throughout that relationship, all Frehner purchases of product from 
Crown have been under terms of Frehner's purchase order contracts, in form and content 
substantially the same as the Bulk Purchase Order involved in this litigation. See Affidavit 
of Michael C. Pack (R. 36-39). 
2. On January 24, 2002, Crown offered a Revised Price Quotation to 
Frehner under which Crown was to provide asphalt to Frehner for the Boulder Highway 
Project in Clark County, Nevada. See Revised Price Quotation (R.41). 
3. The Boulder Highway Project was a roadway construction project 
located in Clark County, Nevada, which was commissioned by and under contract with the 
Nevada Department of Transportation. (R. 25). 
4. On February 2, 2002, defendant Safeco, as Frehner's surety, issued 
payment and performance bonds to the Nevada Department of Transportation to secure 
performance of the contract and payment of amounts properly due to suppliers and 
subcontractors for that project. See Contractor's Bond. (R.50-54). 
5. In addition to the bid, Crown provided to Frehner a proposed Asphalt 
Sales Contract. See Asphalt Sales Contract (R. 43-44). 
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6. Frehner rejected the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract. See Affidavit 
ofMichaelC.Pack. (R. 36-39). 
7. Specifically, Michael C. Pack, Frehner's president, informed Crown that 
Frehner would not sign Crown's proposed Asphalt Sales Contract. Mr. Pack informed 
Crown that Crown was welcome to furnish products to Frehner, but that any Frehner 
purchase would be under the terms of Frehner's standard purchase order agreement, or not 
at all. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack (R. 36-39). 
8. On or about March 8, 2002, Frehner provided a Bulk Purchase Order 
to Crown, ordering the asphalt for the Boulder Highway Project. See, Bulk Purchase Order 
(R. 47-48); Affidavit of Michael C. Pack (R. 36-39). 
9. Crown ultimately did furnish product for the Boulder Highway Project, 
some of which was rejected by the Nevada Department of Transportation for failure to 
comply with contract specifications. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack. (R. 36-39). 
10. The Bulk Purchase Order provides that "venue [for any dispute under 
the purchase order] will be set in Clark County, Nevada" and that the parties "expressly 
waive any objection to jurisdiction and venue in such courts." See Bulk Purchase Order, 
paragraph 20. (R. 48). 
11. Crown's form of Asphalt Sales Contract, providing for venue of any 
dispute in Salt Lake County, Utah, was never accepted or signed by Frehner. See Affidavit 
of Michael C. Pack. (R. 36-39). 
12. Crown delivered the asphalt to the Boulder Highway Project during 
2002, without a signed Asphalt Sales Contract, after notice from Frehner that it would not 
purchase product from Crown under such a contract, and after having received Frehner's 
Bulk Purchase Order. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack. (R. 36-39). 
13. During the course of construction of the Boulder Highway Project, the 
parties did not adhere to the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract payment terms. Payment 
was made consistent with the terms of Frehner's Bulk Purchase Order with no objection from 
Crown. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack. (R. 36-39). 
14. During the course of construction of the Boulder Highway Project, 
Frehner did not provide to Crown scheduling information and "contacts in writing" as 
required by the Asphalt Sales Contract, with no objection from Crown. See Affidavit of 
Michael C. Pack. (R. 36-39). 
15. After delivery of the asphalt by Crown a dispute arose between Crown 
and Frehner regarding the Boulder Highway Project. On or about October 9, 2003, Crown 
filed this action against Frehner in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
(R.l-14) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The dispute in the underlying action between the Crown, Frehner and Frehner's bond 
surety, Safeco, revolves solely around work done on a public works project, i.e., the Boulder 
Highway Proj eel, in Clark County, Nevada. Venue is expressly controlled by Nevada statute, 
which dictates that actions for recovery against a bond on a public works project "shall" be 
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brought in the political subdivision in which the work was performed. Further, the contract 
under which Crown and Frehner conducted business has a forum selection clause which lists 
Clark County, Nevada, as the forum in which suit must be filed. Crown has asserted that it 
tried to change contract terms and that this is a classic case of "battle of the forms." 
Regardless of these assertions, it is clear that this matter is controlled expressly by statute and 
that the district court erred when it denied Frehner and Safeco's Motion to Dismiss the 
action. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff commenced the subject action in the Third District Court, State of Utah, 
relying on general venue provisions and on the terms of an alleged contract with Frehner 
Construction permitting enforcement suits in the courts of this state i.e., the Proposed Asphalt 
Sales Contract. However, the Proposed Asphalt Sales Contract was never signed by Frehner. 
In fact, the operative agreement governing the parties' dealings over the past twenty years 
has always been Frehner's "Bulk Sales Purchase Order" form-which includes a forum 
selection clause designating Nevada courts as the venue for any dispute or disagreement. 
The parties disagree over which forum selection clause applies - that under Frehner's Bulk 
Sales Order or the clause under Crown's Asphalt Sales Contract. However, what might be 
viewed as a "battle of the form case" is resolved more simply by governing statutes. Crown's 
action, which joins Safeco as the surety on Frehner's payment bond for the Nevada project, 
is governed by Nevada statutes, N.R.S. Section 339.055. 
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Under the applicable statute, Crown's action properly lies only in the courts of Clark 
County, Nevada. The Nevada statutes (which are substantially similar to Utah statutes 
governing Utah public improvement projects) require that an action filed against a payment 
bond be filed in the county in which the project is located. In this case, that venue is Clark 
County, Nevada. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
CROWN ACTION WAS PROPERLY FILED IN THE UTAH DISTRICT 
COURT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The question of whether a trial court erred in a ruling regarding a Motion to Dismiss 
is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness with no deference given to the trial 
court's findings. Trillium USA v. Board of County Commissioners, 37 P.3d 1093, 1098 
(Utah 2001). 
B. Rights and Actions on Payment Bonds are Governed by Statute and 
Jurisdiction in this Action Is Proper Only in Clark County, Nevada. 
Nevada Revised Statutes Section 339.055 provides that actions on a payment bond 
furnished for a public improvement project must be filed in the political subdivision in which 
the contract work was to be performed: 
Every action on a payment bond as provided in N.R.S. 339.035 shall be 
brought in the appropriate court of the political subdivision where the 
contract for which the bond was given was to be performed, (emphasis 
added) 
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The Nevada statute is modeled after the federal Miller Act, which similarly provides 
that actions on payment bonds must be filed in any district in which the contract was to be 
performed and executed, and not elsewhere. See, 40 U.S.C. 270b(b). 
The Nevada Supreme Court has held that in all actions against statutory bonds the 
requirements of Nevada's bond statutes apply and may not be waived by contract. See 
Capriotti, Lemon and Associates, Inc. v. Johnson Service Company, 84 Nev. 318, 440 P.2d 
386(1968). 
The contract in this case is for a public improvement project, i.e., construction of the 
Boulder Highway Project, which was commissioned by the Nevada Department of 
Transportation. The payment bond at issue is a statutory bond, subject to the venue 
provisions found in Nevada's Revised Statutes. Under Nevada statutes this action, to the 
extent it includes enforcement of claims on Frehner's payment bond, may properly be filed 
only in Clark County, Nevada. 
Frehner and Safeco assert that the district court erred when it refused to dismiss this 
action. In his Minute Entry issued on March 3, 2004, Judge Fratto made a statement which 
Frehner views as irreconcilable. Judge Fratto stated: 
Nevada's bonding statute, in similar fashion as Utah, dictates the 
appropriate county where an action on the bond is to be 
prosecuted. The statute, however, neither preempts Utah's 
jurisdiction nor mandates Clark County, Nevada as the exclusive 
court with "jurisdiction". 
See, Minute Entry dated March 3, 2004. (R. 109) (emphasis added) 
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Judge Fratto held that Nevada Statute "dictates the appropriate county" in which the 
action should be filed, but does not, however, give the Clark County Court exclusive 
jurisdiction over the matter. Frehner disagrees with this conclusion, especially in light of the 
fact that Nevada Revised Statutes Section 339.055 states that every action on a payment bond 
"shall" be brought in the subdivision in which the bonded work was performed. Therefore, 
it is inconsistent for Judge Fratto to find that Nevada Revised Statutes "dictate" an 
appropriate venue but that the action may still be brought in other jurisdictions. The section 
clearly mandates that the jurisdiction in which the bonded work was performed is the 
exclusive jurisdiction in which the action may be filed.1 
C. The Bulk Sales Contract Dictates the Terms of the Contract Between 
the Parties and it Provides for Venue in Clark County, Nevada Only. 
The Bulk Purchase Order, paragraph 20, provides that "venue will be set in Clark 
County, Nevada" and that the parties "expressly waive any objection to jurisdiction and 
venue in such courts." See Bulk Purchase Order, paragraph 20. (R. 47-48). The Bulk 
Purchase Order was the document under which the parties were operating on the Boulder 
Highway Project. The Bulk Purchase Order governed payment and other practices of the 
parties and contained a forum selection clause. .See Affidavit of Michael Pack. (R. 36-39). 
The majority of courts have determined that forum selection clauses are prima facie 
valid. Adams v. Bay. Ltd.. 60 P.3d 509, 511 (Okla. Ct. App. 2002). The Tenth Circuit has 
1
 An action between the parties regarding the issues in dispute in this action is, in 
fact, pending in Clark County, Nevada and Crown has appeared in that action through 
counsel. Frehner Construction Company vs. Crown Asphalt Product Company, et al. 
Case No. A476263 
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consistently held that forum selection clauses should be enforced unless unreasonable under 
the circumstances. Black & Veatch Construction, Inc. v. ABB Power Generation, Inc., 123 
F. Supp.2d 569, 580 (D. Kan.2000); Double A Home Care, Inc. v. Epsilon Systems, Inc., 15 
F. Supp.2d 1114, 1117 (D. Kan. 1998) (Unless a forum selection clause is clearly 
unreasonable or unjust or was obtained by fraud or overreaching it will be enforced); Jones 
v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990). 
Further, the forum selection clause contained in the Bulk Purchase Order is 
enforceable even though not signed by Crown. In Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 
585, 111 S.Ct. 1522,1527 (1991), the U.S. Supreme Court held that forum selection clauses 
are enforceable even where the clause is not a product of negotiation, but are contained in 
a form contract which is not signed by both parties. In Carnival, passengers of a cruise ship 
sued the cruise line, Carnival, for injury sustained on a cruise ship. Carnival filed a motion 
for summary judgment on the basis that a forum selection clause found in Carnival's passage 
contract ticket required that litigation be filed in Florida. Plaintiffs had filed their action in 
Washington. Plaintiffs argued that they were not bound by the forum selection clause 
because they were merely given the passage contract ticket, had no opportunity to negotiate 
it and did not agree to the forum selection clause. Carnival argued that plaintiff had accepted 
passage and therefore accepted the terms of the passage contract ticket. Carnival's motion 
was granted. The case was appealed and eventually heard by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. The United States Supreme Court held that the clause was enforceable 
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because it was not a result of fraud or overreaching and because the plaintiff had notice of 
the clause, which was found on the passage contract ticket. Id. at 1528. 
The Bulk Purchase Order was provided to Crown and accepted after Frehner rejected 
Crown's Asphalt Sales Contract and after Michael Pack informed Crown that any dealings 
would be under the terms of the Frehner Bulk Purchase Order. See Affidavit of Michael C. 
Pack. (R. 36-39). Further, Crown supplied the asphalt on the Boulder Highway Project after 
the Bulk Purchase Order was provided by Frehner and the parties conducted business in 
accord with the terms of the Bulk Purchase Order. See Affidavit of Michael C. Pack. (R. 
36-39). 
The venue provisions of the Bulk Purchase Order should be enforced by this court and 
this court should acknowledge that venue in this court is improper. 
D. Judge Fratto's Opinion is Contrary to the Opinion of Third District 
Court Judge Boy den Regarding Virtually Identical Issues. 
It is important to note that the exact issues raised in this appeal and addressed by Third 
District Court Judge Fratto in this case were addressed by Third District Court Judge Boyden 
in Crown Asphalt Products Company v. Road & Highway Builders, LLC, et al, Case No. 
030922469. The case before Judge Boyden was also filed by Crown against a subcontractor 
that worked on the Interstate Highway system in Elko, Nevada. The subcontractor was Road 
& Highway Builders, L.L.C. ("Road & Highway"). Their bond surety was Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company ("Liberty"). Counsel for Road & Highway and Liberty filed a Motion 
to Dismiss for lack of Venue and Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and a Memorandum in 
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support thereof arguing the same thing that Frehner argued before Judge Fratto, i.e., that the 
matter involved construction on a public works project in Nevada (in that case, Elko County) 
and that Nevada Revised Statute Section 339.055 dictated that the action must be brought in 
the political subdivision where the work was to be performed. See Memorandum in Support 
of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Venue and Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, 
attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Crown opposed the motion making the same arguments as 
were made against Frehner before Judge Fratto. See Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Venue and Lack of Personal Jurisdiction attached 
hereto as Exhibit 2. Judge Boyden ruled on the motion finding that the reasons for dismissal 
asserted in Road & Highway and Liberty's briefs had merit. Judge Boyden granted the 
Motion to Dismiss. See Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, attached hereto as 
Exhibit 3. Deference should be given to the state of Nevada to resolve disputes in its 
prescribed courts, over its own public works. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be reversed. 
DATED this 2M - d a y of June, 2004. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
JiUJL Dunyon 
Attorneys for Defendants/Petitioners Frehner 
Construction Co., Inc. and Safe Co. Insurance 
Company America 
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BARBARA K. BERRETT (A4273) 
MARK D. TAYLOR (A9533) 
BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants Road & Highway Builders, L.L.C., 
and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 530 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7733 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7711 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CROWN ASPHALT PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROAD & HIGHWAY BUILDERS, L.L.C., a 
Nevada Limited Liability Corporation, and 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Massachusetts Corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR LACK OF VENUE AND LACK OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Civil No. 030922469 
Judge Ann Boyden 
Defendants, Road & Highway Builders, L.L.C., ("Road & Highway") and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company ("Liberty"), by and through their counsel of record, Barbara K. Berrett and 
Mark D. Taylor, BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C, hereby submit their Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Venue and Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This case concerns claims by Crown Asphalt Products Company ("CAPCO") that arise 
out of the alleged breach of a road construction agreement with Road & Highway. In 2002, Road 
& Highway was awarded a Nevada public road construction contract by the Nevada Department 
of Transportation ("NDOT") to construct a portion of the Interstate Highway System in Elko 
County, Nevada. After being awarded the contract, Liberty, as Road & Highway's surety, issued 
a payment bond to NDOT, to secure the payment of amounts properly due to suppliers and 
subcontractors for the Nevada road project. In October 2002, without any solicitation on the part 
of Road & Highway, CAPCO submitted a bid in Nevada offering to provide Road & Highway 
with road construction materials for the Nevada road project. Road & Highway and CAPCO 
subsequently reached an oral agreement in Nevada whereby CAPCO agreed to deliver project 
construction materials to the Elko County, Nevada construction site to be used on the project. 
CAPCO now alleges that it was not paid for supplies it delivered to the Elko County, 
Nevada road project and has filed this action in Utah's Third District Court, asserting claims 
against both Road & Highway and Liberty. However, even if CAPCO's claims were true, which 
they are not, its Complaint must be dismissed for lack of venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Venue in Utah is improper as both federal and state law requires that all actions to recover 
against a payment bond must be brought in the county where the contract was to be performed. 
In this case the undisputed location for the performance of the contract was Elko County, 
Nevada. Moreover, even if Utah was an appropriate venue for this action, which it is not, this 
case should be dismissed as Utah has no personal jurisdiction over Road & Highway under the 
2 
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facts of this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, Road and Highway and Liberty submit the 
following relevant facts: 
1. Plaintiff, CAPCO, is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business 
located in Davis County, Utah. Complaint at If 1, attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. Plaintiff has worked on other public road construction projects within the State of 
Nevada. 
3. Defendant, Road and Highway, is a Nevada Limited Liability Corporation that 
provides road and highway construction services for public works construction projects in 
Nevada. Affidavit of Road & Highway President and Managing Member, Richard Howard 
Buenting ("Buenting Aff.") at f 3, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
4. Plaintiff, CAPCO, claims that this Court has jurisdiction over Road & Highway 
"pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (2002) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22 through § 78-27-
24 (2002)" which are provisions of Utah's long-arm statute. Complaint at H 4. 
5. Despite Plaintiffs reliance upon Utah's long arm statue to purportedly establish 
personal jurisdiction over Road and Highway, Plaintiffs Complaint never alleges that any of its 
claims actually arise out of or relate to any business that Road and Highway actually conducted 
within the State of Utah. See generally, Complaint. 
6. In fact, all of Plaintiff s claims essentially arise out of the alleged breach of a road 
m^mm^^m* 
.Jill Dunyon - MEMO JPJDISMISS j c £ _ , „ ^ „ . _ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ „ Page 
construction agreement that was entered into in Nevada and involved work that was to be 
performed in Nevada. Buenting Aff. at K 16,17. 
7. Road & Highway's only office is located in Reno, Nevada. Buenting Aff. at f 4. 
8. Road & Highway does not own, lease, or control any property in the State of 
Utah, whether real or personal. Buenting Aff. at Tf 5. 
9. Road & Highway does not have any bank accounts in the State of Utah. Buenting 
Aff. at U 6. 
10. Road & Highway does not maintain any offices, phone numbers or facsimile 
listings in Utah. Buenting Aff. at f 7. 
11. Road & Highway does not maintain any employees in the State of Utah. Buenting 
Aff. at 1 8. 
12. Road & Highway does not specifically recruit employees from the State of Utah. 
Buenting Aff. at 19. 
13. Road & Highway does not advertise in Utah publications and does not send 
salespersons into Utah for the purpose of soliciting Utah business. Buenting Aff. at f 10. 
14. Road & Highway does not maintain a website. Buenting Aff. at Tf 11. 
15. Road & Highway does not have any construction jobs in Utah and has never 
worked on a construction site located within the State of Utah. Buenting Aff. at If 12. 
16. In 2002 Road & Highway was awarded a Nevada public road construction 
contract by NDOT to construct a portion of the Interstate Highway System in Elko County, 
Nevada. Buenting Aff. at f 13. 
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17. After being awarded the contract, Liberty, as Road & Highway's surety, issued a 
payment bond to NDOT to secure the payment of amounts properly due to suppliers and 
subcontractors for the Nevada road project. Buenting Aff. at f 17. 
18. In October 2002, without any solicitation on the part of Road & Highway, 
CAPCO submitted a bid in Nevada, offering to provide Road & Highway with road construction 
materials for the Nevada road construction project. Buenting Aff. at ^ 14, 15. 
19. Road & Highway and CAPCO subsequently reached an agreement in Nevada 
whereby CAPCO agreed to deliver project construction materials to the Elko County, Nevada 
construction site to be used on the project. Buenting Aff, at f 16. 
20. The Payment Bond provided by Liberty for the Elko County, Nevada road 
construction project involved construction work that was to be performed in Elko County, 
Nevada. Buenting Aff. at Tf 17, Copy of the payment bond attached to Buenting Aff. as Exhibit 
1. 
ARGUMENT 
I. VENUE IN UTAH IS IMPROPER AS ACTIONS ON PAYMENT BONDS MUST 
BE BROUGHT IN THE COUNTY WHERE THE CONTRACT WAS TO BE 
PERFORMED. 
Venue in Utah is improper as both federal and state law require that all actions to recover 
against a payment bond must be brought in the county where the contract was to be performed. 
Plaintiff incorrectly relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 to assert jurisdiction against the 
defendants in this case. Complaint % 4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 states that "[t]he district court 
has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal... not prohibited by law." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3-4 (emphasis added). However, Utah law specifically states that "[a]n action upon a 
payment bond shall be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction in any county where the 
construction contract was to be performed and not elsewhere."" Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38 
(2003) (emphasis added). Similarly, Nevada law provides that actions on payment bonds must 
be filed in the political subdivision in which the contract work was to be performed. Nevada 
Revised Statute § 339.055 states that: 
Every action on a payment bond as provided in NRS 339.035 shall be brought in 
the appropriate court of the political subdivision where the contract for which the 
bond was given was to be performed. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 339.055. 
Both the Utah and Nevada bond statues are modeled after the Federal Miller Act, which 
provides that actions on payment bonds must be filed in any federal district in which the contract 
was to be performed and executed. 40 U.S.C. 270b(b). 
In addition, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that in all actions against statutory bonds 
the requirements of Nevada's bond statute apply even when absent from the terms of the bond 
itself. See, Capriotti Lemon and Assoc, Inc. v. Johnson Service Co., 84 Nev. 318, 440 P.2d 386 
(1968) (holding that when a bond required by a statute contains language inconsistent with the 
purpose of the statute, the language of the statute will be "read into" the bond so as to accomplish 
the purpose of the statute.) 
The contract that is the subject of this lawsuit involves a public improvement project, i.e., 
construction of a portion of the Interstate Highway in Elko County, Nevada. As indicated above, 
the undisputed location for the performance of this contract is Elko County, Nevada. Buenting 
6 
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Affidavit At Tf 13. Accordingly, venue is only proper in Elko County, Nevada pursuant to Utah, 
Nevada and Federal law. Thus, Liberty, as the surety, and Road and Highway, as the bond 
principal and indemnitor, request that plaintiffs complaint be dismissed for lack of venue. 
II. EVEN IF UTAH WAS AN APPROPRIATE VENUE FOR THIS ACTION. 
WHICH IT IS NOT, THIS CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS UTAH HAS NO 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER ROAD & HIGHWAY. 
Under Utah law, Plaintiff has the burden of showing both that a Utah statute and due 
process considerations permit this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Road & Highway, 
a nonresident, Reno-based Nevada Corporation. Plaintiff cannot meet this burden because the 
long arm statute upon which plaintiff relies to establish jurisdiction and Utah due process case 
law require, at a minimum, that plaintiff show a relationship between its claim against Road & 
Highway and Road & Highway's contacts within the State of Utah. Here, there is no such 
relationship. 
Plaintiff has sued Road and Highway to recover for damages resulting from the alleged 
breach of a road construction agreement which was entered into in Nevada and was to be 
performed in Nevada. Plaintiff can point to no Road & Highway conduct in Utah that is the 
bases for any of its claims in this case. Thus, under Utah law, there is no basis upon which this 
Court may assert personal jurisdiction over Road & Highway. 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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Under Utah law, Plaintiff has the burden to show that this Court may properly assert 
personal jurisdiction over Road & Highway.1 The standard of review applicable to judge 
whether Plaintiff has met this burden varies slightly, depending on whether an evidentiary 
hearing is held. If this Court decides this issue based upon documentary evidence alone, the 
standard is as follows: 
[The Complaint's allegations are] taken as true to the extent they are 
uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the parties present conflicting 
affidavits, all factual disputes must be resolved in the plaintiffs favor, and the 
plaintiffs prima facie showing is sufficient notwithstanding the contrary 
presentation by the moving party. However, only the well-pled facts of plaintiff s 
complaint, as distinguished from mere conclusory allegations must be accepted as 
true.2 
Thus, if this Court decides the jurisdiction issue on the basis of the documentary 
evidence, it may reject any conclusory allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint, and may adopt the 
facts in Road & Highway's supportive affidavit. Further, if the Court holds a hearing, it need not 
resolve disputes between competing affidavits in Plaintiffs favor, but may weigh the competing 
1
 Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstr. Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah 
1990) (J. Durham) (reh'g den., Feb. 6, 1991) (discussing contours of plaintiff s "burden" here). 
2
 PurCo Fleet Serv., Inc. v. Towers, 38 F. Supp.2d 1320 1320, 1322-23 (D. Utah 1999) (quoting 
Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)); seeNewways 
v. McAusland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 (Utah 1997): 
[If the Court] proceeds on documentary evidence alone (i.e., the first two 
methods), the plaintiff is only required to make a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction. In addition, the plaintiffs factual allegations are accepted as true 
unless specifically controverted by the defendant's affidavits or by depositions, 
but any disputes in the documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiffs favor. 
(citations and emphasis omitted). The Utah Supreme Court had relies upon Tenth Circuit 
standards of review for 12(b)(2) motions. Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827. 
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evidence.3 
B. UNDER SETTLED UTAH LAW AND THE FACTS OF THIS CASE, 
THERE IS NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN UTAH OVER ROAD & 
HIGHWAY. 
Until recently, Utah courts have analyzed whether personal jurisdiction exists over 
nonresident defendants using phrases such as "specific jurisdiction," "general jurisdiction" and 
"nexus test." Last year, however, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the "various tests" that have 
been "applied . . . in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident 
defendant," seeing a need to "clarify the law regarding this issue." State ex rel. W.A., 2002 UT 
127 m| 11-14. The court explained that "the proper test to be applied in determining whether 
personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident," like Road & Highway, requires analysis of two 
considerations: 
First, the court must assess whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over 
the nonresident defendant. This means that a court may rely on any Utah statute 
affording it personal jurisdiction, not just Utah's long-arm statute. Second, 
assuming Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, 
the court must assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with the due 
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id at f 14 (emphasis in original). 
Under this "new test," a Utah court may assert personal jurisdiction over Road & 
Highway only if (1) a Utah statute initially affords such; and (2) if such jurisdiction does not 
compromise Road & Highway's due process rights. Id at Iff 15-16 (noting that the court's "new 
tes t . . . recognizes the legislature's authority to provide for the extension of personal jurisdiction 
as limited by established constitutional due process requirements.") Here, however, neither 
3
 Anderson, 807 P.2d at 826. 
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element is met because Plaintiffs claims against Road & Highway arise from events that 
occurred only in Nevada, and because Road & Highway does not conduct any business within the 
state of Utah. 
1. NO UTAH STATUTE CONFERS UTAH WITH PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER ROAD & HIGHWAY. 
Under the first prong of the Utah Supreme Court's test in W.A., for Road & Highway to 
be subject to Utah personal jurisdiction, a Utah statute must initially confer such jurisdiction. 
Here, Plaintiff relies upon Utah's long arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22, et. seq.9 to 
establish jurisdiction over Road & Highway. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 states: 
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself, and 
if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state as to any claim arising out of or related to: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state . . . . 
Utah Code Ann § 78-27-24 (emphasis added).4 The terms of this statute do not provide this 
Court with a basis upon which to assert personal jurisdiction over Road & Highway because 
none of plaintiff s claims "arise from or are related to" any Road & Highway business transacted 
within Utah, nor do they arise from any contracting on Road & Highway's part to supply goods 
or services "in this state." Indeed, none of plaintiff s allegations link Road and Highway to any 
4
 See Complaint at ^ 4. Plaintiff also cites § 78-27-22, the long arm statute's "purpose" 
statement, which provides that the statute should be applied to the "fullest extent permitted by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." The Utah 
Supreme Court incorporates this principle into its two-step jurisdictional analysis, thus, 
additional analysis of this statutory provision is unnecessary. 
10 
conduct within the State of Utah. The contract that is the subject of this lawsuit involves a public 
improvement project for a portion of the Interstate Highway located in Elko County, Nevada. 
Buenting Aff. at If 16, 17. Without any solicitation on the part of Road & Highway, plaintiff 
submitted a bid in Nevada offering to provide Road & Highway with road construction materials 
for the Nevada road project. Id. As part of the Nevada contract, Plaintiff agreed to deliver 
construction materials to Elko County, Nevada. Id. Moreover, Road & Highway has no other 
contact with the State of Utah. Road & Highway's only office is located in Reno, Nevada and it 
does not own, lease, or control any property in the State of Utah, whether real or personal. 
Buenting Aff. at Iff 4-5. Road & Highway does not have any bank accounts in the State of Utah 
and does not maintain any offices, phone numbers or facsimile listings in Utah. Buenting Aff. at 
1fl[ 6-7. Road & Highway does not maintain any employees in the State of Utah and does not 
specifically recruit employees from the State of Utah. Buenting Aff. at ffi[ 8-9. Road & Highway 
does not maintain a website, does not advertise in Utah publications and does not send 
salespersons into Utah for the purpose of soliciting Utah business. Buenting Aff. at ff 10-11. 
Moreover, Road & Highway has never worked on a construction site located within the State of 
Utah. Buenting Aff. at f 12. 
Clearly, Plaintiffs claims do not arise out of, and are not related to, any Road & Highway 
contacts within Utah, whether the "transaction of business," "contracting to supply goods or 
services," or otherwise. Thus, this Court should find that the plain language of the long arm 
statute does not provide jurisdiction in Utah over Road & Highway and that the conclusory 
jurisdictional allegation in Plaintiffs Complaint is insufficient to satisfy Plaintiffs burden of 
11 
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proof. Therefore, Plaintiffs Complaint against Road & Highway should be dismissed without 
prejudice. 
2. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT PERMIT UTAH 
COURTS TO EXERCISE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER 
ROAD & HIGHWAY. 
Even if Road & Highway's conduct somehow implicated Utah's long arm statue, due 
process notions would still prohibit personal jurisdiction in Utah. Utah state courts may exercise 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, like Road & Highway, only if such comports with the 
due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution upon 
an analysis of two factors. W.A., 2002 UT 127114. First, Road & Highway must have, through 
"minimum contacts," purposefully availed itself of Utah laws and privileges such that it should 
"reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." First Mort. Corp, v. State Street Bank and 
Trust Co., 173 F. Supp.2d 1167, 1173 (D. Utah 2001) (applying Utah law) (citations omitted). 
Second, jurisdiction over Road & Highway must be fair and just. Id. Under these factors, this 
Court should find that personal jurisdiction over Road & Highway in Utah violates due process. 
First, under Utah Supreme Court case law, Road & Highway clearly does not have the 
sort of "minimum contacts" with Utah that would permit a Utah court to assert long-arm based 
jurisdiction because Plaintiffs claims are unrelated to any Road & Highway contact with Utah. 
The Utah Supreme Court has emphatically held that in cases where the plaintiff seeks to establish 
personal jurisdiction "pursuant to the long-arm statute," as Plaintiff seeks to do here, Utah courts 
"do not have the power to take jurisdiction over non-resident defendants unless the litigation is 
related to acts of the defendant by which it 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
12 
conducting activities within the forum state.'" Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1311 
(Utah 1980) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, n. 5 (1977)); see also Mallory Eng., Inc. 
v. TedR. Brown & Assoc, Inc., 618 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah 1980) (noting that nonresident 
defendant must have such minimum "contacts with [Utah] as make it reasonable, in the context 
of our federal system of government, to require [it] to defend the particular suit which is brought 
. . . . ) ; First Mortgage Corp., 173 F. Supp.2d at 1173 (noting that Plaintiffs claims must arise 
from "actions by [the defendant] that create a substantial connection with [Utah]"). 
Under these principles, Road & Highway clearly does not have the required minimum 
contacts with Utah such that personal jurisdiction would comport with its due process rights. As 
discussed above, Road & Highway does not conduct business in Utah and has no other contact 
with the State of Utah. See Buenting Aff. generally. Therefore, this Court should find that any 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Road & Highway in Utah is improper. 
Further, personal jurisdiction in Utah over Road & Highway would offend notions of fair 
play and substantial justice. "Reduced to more practical terms," the Utah Supreme Court has 
instructed that this fairness inquiry "concerns: (1) whether the cause of action arises out of or has 
a substantial connection with [the defendant's in-state] activity; and (2) the balancing of the 
convenience of the parties and the interests of the state in assuming jurisdiction." Mallory Eng., 
618 P.2d at 1008 (citations omitted). 
These fairness considerations weigh heavily in favor of this Court declining to assert 
personal jurisdiction over Road & Highway. First, as has been discussed, Plaintiffs claims 
against Road & Highway have no connection to any Road & Highway contact with Utah. 
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Second, a balancing of the convenience of the parties and Utah's interest in hosting this litigation 
leads to the conclusion that Plaintiffs Complaint against Road & Highway should be dismissed. 
Conducting this litigation in Utah creates a significant burden for all of the parties involved as 
the public road project at issue in this case took place in Nevada. Thus, the vast majority of the 
witnesses will be located in Nevada. In addition, all of the parties will need to conduct 
significant discovery regarding the construction of the road in Nevada where it is located, rather 
than Utah. Moreover, the construction at issue in this case involves a Nevada public road project 
and, therefore, involves significant Nevada state interests. Simply put, Utah has very little 
interest in hosting this litigation. As such, this Court should find that forcing Road & Highway 
to travel to Utah to defend this action would violate due process notions of fairness and 
substantial justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed for lack of venue and lack of personal 
jurisdiction. Venue in Utah is improper as both federal and state law requires that all actions to 
recover against a payment bond must be brought in the county where the contract was to be 
performed, i.e., Elko County, Nevada. Moreover, even if Utah was an appropriate venue for this 
action, which it is not, this case should be dismissed as Utah has no personal jurisdiction over 
Road & Highway. Therefore, Defendants, Road & Highway and Liberty, respectfully request 
that Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed. 
DATED this day of November, 2003. 
14 
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BERRETT & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
BARBARA K. BERRETT 
MARK D. TAYLOR 
Attorneys for Defendants Road & Highway 
Builders, L.L.C., and Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 2003,1 caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following: 
Jeffrey W. Shields 
Angela W. Adams 
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, lip 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
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Jeffrey W. Shields (#2948) 
Angela W. Adams (#9081) 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
One Utah Center, Suite 600 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 531-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 531-3001 
Attorneys for Crown Asphalt Products Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CROWN ASPHALT PRODUCTS j 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROAD & HIGHWAY BUILDERS, 
L.L.C., a Nevada Limited Liability 
Corporation, and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a j 
Massachusetts Corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR LACK OF VENUE 
AND LACK OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
Civil No. 030922469 
Honorable Ann Boyden 
Plaintiff Crown Asphalt Products Co. ("CAPCO") a Utah corporation, by and 
through its counsel, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, hereby submits this Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Venue and Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction. For the reasons stated below, Defendants5 motion should be denied. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Road and Highway Builders, LLC ("RHB"), and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Co. ("Liberty") have moved to dismiss the Complaint in this action on two basic 
grounds. First, Defendants assert that this Court is an improper venue for the adjudication of this 
dispute because both Nevada and Utah have enacted statutes patterned after the federal Miller 
UT DOCS_A #1139431 v1 
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Act which provides that an action on a performance bond must be brought in the county in which 
the contract bonded was to be completed. There are two simple problems with this argument. 
First, the courts have been clear in unanimously holding that the venue requirements of the 
Miller Act, and therefore, the Utah and Nevada statutes, can be waived. Secondly, even if this 
Court finds that this venue requirement was not waived, it only applies to the causes of action 
against Liberty for payment on the bond. It does not apply, or even attempt to apply, to the 
causes of action against RHB for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud and for dishonored instrument under Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1. 
Because the Miller Act requirements can be waived and because, in any event, these venue 
requirements do not reach the claims against RHB, this venue argument does not mandate 
dismissal of the Complaint. 
Defendants second argument for dismissal is that this Court lacks jurisdiction 
over RHB. This assertion is without weight. RHB signed a contract with CAPCO in which it 
expressly, explicitly consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. Because RHB unequivocally 
consented to the jurisdiction of this Court, RHB is not entitled to dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff CAPCO is a Utah coiporation with its principal place of business 
in Davis County, Utah. CAPCO supplies asphalt to companies that, in turn, use the asphalt for 
road and highway construction. 
2. Defendant RHB is a Nevada limited liability corporation with its principal 
place of business in Reno, Nevada. RHB is a road paving company. Defendant Liberty is a 
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Massachusetts corporation that, among other things, provides bonds to construction and/or 
paving companies bidding on state government projects. 
3. On October 31, 2002, CAPCO submitted a Confidential Price Quotation, 
("Bid"), to RHB under which CAPCO offered and agreed to supply RHB with approximately 
15,000 Short Tons of AC 20P Asphalt Oil at $194.75 per Short Ton, and approximately 1093 
Short Tons of CSS-1H Asphalt Emulsion at either $112.00 or $127.00 per Short Ton, depending 
on the concentration of the CSS-1H, F.O.B. Woods Cross, UT, (the 'Asphalt"). The sales terms 
of the Bid were expressly based on several conditions. Among other things, the Bid was given 
"expressly subject to the terms and conditions of CAPCO's Asphalt Sales Contract." (A true and 
correct copy of the Confidential Price Quotation is attached to the Affidavit of Jeffery W. Shields 
("Shields Aff."), filed concurrently, as Exhibit A). 
4. RHB accepted the terms of CAPCO's Bid, including the condition that it 
be subject to all the terms of the Asphalt Sales Contract, ("Contract") by accepting CAPCO's 
offer and ordering the Asphalt. Additionally, RHB signed the Contract expressly consenting to 
its provisions. (A true and correct copy of the Contract is attached to the Shields Aff. as Exhibit 
B). 
5. The Contract explicitly incorporated into the Bid, and signed by RHB, 
provides, among other things, the following condition: 
12. Governing Law: This Agreement shall be governed 
by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the State 
of Utah (exclusive of the conflict of laws provisions 
thereof). Seller and Purchaser hereby consent to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of that state. The proper venue 
for any legal dispute hereunder shall be the state district 
court or federal court in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(Shields Aff., Exhibit B, p. 2, f 12 (emphasis added)). 
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6. It should be noted that RHB amended several of the provisions of the 
Contract before signing. Although it is CAPCO's position that the unaltered Contract is the 
operative agreement between the parties, it is notable that even though RHB altered several of 
the provisions of the Contract before signing, it did not even attempt to alter or change in any 
way paragraph 12, cited above, which provides that the buyer, RHB, expressly consents to the 
jurisdiction of this Court. Id. 
7. Beginning in June 2003, RHB began failing and refusing to tender timely 
payment for Asphalt delivered pursuant to the Contract. 
8. Accordingly, CAPCO contacted RHB on July 8, 2003, and demanded 
payment of past due amounts and pre-payment of all future deliveries, stating that failure to pay 
these amounts would force CAPCO to cancel the Contract and refuse to deliver any more 
Asphalt. Richard Buenting, RHB's president, indicated that although RHB did not have the 
ability to pre-pay for future deliveries of the Asphalt, RHB would bring its account with CAPCO 
current. 
9. Pursuant to this representation, on July 8, 2003, RHB issued a check to 
CAPCO for $84,519.84, for eleven outstanding invoices. 
10. In reliance upon these facts and representations, CAPCO began to again 
deliver Asphalt to RHB. CAPCO relied on RHB's representations that future payments would 
be made in a timely manner and on RHB's payment of the outstanding invoices in delivering 
Asphalt to RHB after July 8, 2003. 
11. On July 15, 2003, CAPCO's bank notified CAPCO that RHB's check was 
being returned unpaid. The bank stated that RHB had stopped payment of the check. 
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12. Pursuant to the terms of the Contract, CAPCO immediately notified RHB 
that it was in breach of the Contract. CAPCO demanded full, immediate payment of all 
outstanding amounts, which, including the 584,519.84, totaled $195,768.19. 
13. RHB has failed and refused to pay CAPCO for this Asphalt pursuant to 
the Contract. To date, RHB owes CAPCO $195,768.19 for Asphalt delivered to RHB during 
June and July 2003 plus interest on that amount. 
14. CAPCO has, on numerous occasions, demanded payment for the Asphalt 
delivered to RHB. RHB has refused to pay the money due under the Contract. 
15. On August 4, 2003, CAPCO notified Liberty, through the Nevada 
Department of Transportation ("NDOT"), that RHB had failed and refused to tender payment 
for Asphalt delivered, which payment was secured by a performance bond ("Bond") issued to 
RHB by Liberty. Liberty has failed to pay CAPCO pursuant to the Bond. 
16. Accordingly, CAPCO filed this action on October 9, 2003. On November 
24,2003, Defendants moved to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
Paragraph 12 of the contract provides that the parties agree to the propriety of 
both venue and jurisdiction with this Court. Accordingly, Defendants5 Motion to Dismiss should 
be denied. 
I. Venue is Proper in This Court Pursuant to the Terms of the Contract. 
Defendants argue that "[b]oth the Utah and Nevada bond statutes are modeled 
after the Federal Miller Act, which provides that actions on payment bonds must be filed in any 
federal district in which the contract was to be performed and executed. 40 U.S.C. 270b(b)." 
(Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss ("Defendants' Mem."), at 6). Defendants' 
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assertion that the Miller Act so provides and that the Utah and Nevada statutes are substantively 
identical, mandating the same requirements, is absolutely correct.1 However, courts that have 
considered circumstances such as those present in this case have unanimously held that "a valid 
forum selection clause supersedes the Miller Act's venue provision." United States ex rel B&D 
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. St, Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 1115, 1117 (10th Cir. 1995). 
In B&D, the court addressed the concern raised by Defendants regarding the 
provision in both the Miller Act and in Utah Code Ann, § 63-56-38 that dictates that an action on 
a payment bond must be brought in a court in the county in which the contract was to be 
performed "and not elsewhere." See 40 U.S.C. § 270b(b); Utah Code Ann. §63-56-38. 
"Although the language of the Miller Act, 20 U.S.C. § 270b(b), requiring that suits be brought in 
the judicial district where the contract was performed "and not elsewhere' seems to mandate 
strict conformance, judicial interpretation holds otherwise. While dealing with the merits of 
another issue, the Supreme Court characterized § 270b(b) as being 'merely a venue 
requirement.'" B&D, 70 F.3d at 1117. Because the Supreme Court held that § 270b(b) is a 
venue requirement and because "[i]t is well settled that venue provisions are subject to 
contractual waiver" the B&D Court held that "a valid forum selection clause supersedes the 
Miller Act's venue provision." Id. In so holding, the B&D Court held as follows: 
Three circuits have addressed forum selection clauses that conflict 
with the Miller Act's venue provisions. All three have held that as 
1
 Defendants' cite Nevada Revised Statutes ("NRS") 339.055 as the applicable statute. However, the 
operative statute in this case is NRS 408.363. The Nevada Department of Transportation confirmed this on 
July 28, 2003, by letter to CAPCO. The letter, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit C, 
provides, "If upon completion and acceptance of the project you find that monies are due your 
organization, you should file a claim as provided by NRS 408.363, a copy of which is attached." (Id.) The 
NRS section provided does not demand venue in any particular court. (Id. at Exhibit C). As provided by 
NDOT, this is the Nevada statute applicable to the current case. It clearly provides for the adjudication of 
this dispute by setting forth the appropriate procedure and applicable time periods. Id. Noticeably, 
however, this statute does not provide a particular venue for the hearing of such disputes. Id. Therefore, 
any court of proper jurisdiction is a proper venue for this case. 
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a mere venue requirement, § 270b(b) is subject to contractual 
waiver by a valid forum selection clause. 
Id. (citing FGS Constructors, Inc. v. Carlow, 64 R3d 1230, 1233 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding the 
Miller Act's venue requirement could be waived by defendants); United States ex rel Pittsburgh 
Tank & Tower, Inc. v. G&C Enterprises, Inc., 62 F.3d 35, 36 (1st Cir. 1995) (same); In re 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 R2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979) (same)). 
The cases cited by the B&D Court concur in holding that a forum selection clause 
trumps the Miller Act venue provision on which both the Utah and Nevada statutes are based. 
For example, the Fireman fs Fund Court, in holding that venue may be varied by contract, stated 
that "[wjhile the phrase 'and not elsewhere5 would initially appear to foreclose further 
discussion, it must be remembered that this subsection is not jurisdictional but only a venue 
provision." 588 F.2d at 95. There, the Fifth Circuit held that the contractual venue provision 
superceded the Miller Act. Id. Likewise, the G&C Enterprises Court held that the forum 
selection clause in the parties' agreement was binding and enforceable over the Miller Act's 
venue provision. 62 F.3d at 36-37. See also United States of America ex rel Giannola Masonry 
Co. v. PJ. Dick Inc., 79 RSupp.2d 803, 807 (E.D.Mich. 2000) ("The Court finds that plaintiff 
has waived its Miller Act venue argument in light of the existence of the clear and unambiguous 
forum-selection clause present in the case at bar. It is well-settled that venue provisions have 
long been subject to contractual waiver through a valid forum selection agreement. Moreover, 
courts have held that a valid forum selection clause supersedes the Miller Act's venue 
provision.") (citations omitted); United States of America ex rel Tech Coatings v. Mriler-Stauch 
Construction Co., Inc., 904 F.Supp. 1209, 1213 (D. Kan. 1995) ("The venue requirement under 
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the Miller Act.. .is like any other conventional venue provision; it can be contractually waived by 
a valid forum selection clause.")2 
"It is well settled that venue provisions are subject to contractual waiver." B&D, 
70 F.3d at 1117 (citing National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315, 84 S.Ct. 
411, 414, 11 L.Ed.2d 354 (1964)). Because RHB waived the venue requirements of both state 
and federal law by agreeing to venue and jurisdiction in this Court, Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss should be denied.3 
II. Jurisdiction in This Court is Proper Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. 
Defendants next argue that this Court does not have jurisdiction over RHB. They 
attack the jurisdiction of this Court on two bases: (1) the long-arm statute does not apply, and (2) 
RHB's due process rights would be compromised if this Court retained jurisdiction over this 
matter. (Defendants' Mem. at 8-9). Since neither of these points warrants dismissal of the 
Complaint, Defendants' Motion should be denied. 
A. Utah's Long Arm Statute Properly Confers Jurisdiction on this 
Court. 
Defendants argue that Utah's long-arm statute does not reach RHB because RHB 
does not transact business within this state. (Defendants' Mem. at 10). However, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-23 defines the "transaction of business within this state" to "mean activities of a 
nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state which affect persons or 
2
 Although neither Utah nor Nevada has ever had the opportunity to address this waiver of venue, 
Defendants correctly point out that "[b]oth the Utah and Nevada bond statutes are modeled after the Federal Miller 
Act..." (Defendants' Mem. at 6). Accordingly, the Court should look to the interpretation of the substantively 
identical federal statute for guidance on this issue. 
3
 Even if this Court chooses not to adopt the unanimous opinion of courts that the venue provisions of the 
state and federal laws governing claims on bonds can be waived, RHB is still not entitled to dismissal because the 
action on the bond is only against Liberty. CAPCO's claims against RHB are entirely distinct from the claim 
against the bond and, therefore, RHB is not entitled to dismissal either way. 
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businesses in this state regardless of the ..^lenaants piiv^al presence in this state SII 
MegaDiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 4j-t-i j ^uiau iyyo); 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d l l06 (Utah 1985). • Further "jurisdiction 'may 
contacts are sufficient." SII, 96v Kzc at 433-434-(quoting Burger King Corp, v. Rudzewicz, 4 71 
RHB contacted CAPCO many times during the course of conducting busiL ^ 
^ - - . - " • ' - • • l e 
method to proceed with the Contract after 1RHB failed and recused to pay CAPCO for Asphalt. 
j--nnci, . .; J sent payment for goous to . .. , ,;, . ±>. ., ...* - ii flopped payment on one 
of these checks that was sent to CAPCO in Utah after using the promise of the- payment to induce 
CAPCO to deliver more Asphalt to Rxiii These contacts satisfy the test set .forth in Burger King 
and reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in SII. 
In 57/ the Utah Supreme Court, recognizing that persons living outside of Utah 
often transact business in Utah without physically bei ng in 1 Jtah held; 
It is an. inescapable fact of modem ' commercial' life that a 
substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and 
wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for 
physical presence within a State in which business is conducted. 
So long as a commercial actor's efforts are "purposefully directed" 
toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the 
notion that an 'absence of physical • contacts can. • defeat personal 
jurisdiction there. 
This is more true today than it was in 1985 when Burger King was 
decided. Expanding business opportunities unfortunately give rise 
to expanding opportunities for breach of contract,, injury, and 
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fraud. More than ever, "the public interest demands that the 
state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant 
minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens 
entitled to the state's protection." 
SII, 969 P.2d 434-435 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. 476) (emphasis added). 
The rationale given in SII was adopted to avoid the type of motion filed by 
Defendants. In SII: 
The orders were received in Utah, filled in Utah, and invoiced in 
Utah, and the products were shipped from Utah. [Defendant] 
mailed its payments to Utah, and its default on the payments 
injured a corporation. All of these activities "affected persons or 
businesses within the State of Utah/9 
Id. (quoting Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1110). 
The facts are identical in this case, with the exception of the fact that RHB did not 
place orders to CAPCO for the product exchanged. Otherwise, however, the elements are the 
same here. RHB and CAPCO entered into a Contract whereby CAPCO was to deliver Asphalt 
to RHB. The Asphalt was prepared in Utah, invoiced in Utah, and shipped from Utah. RHB 
mailed its payments to Utah, and its default cf the Contract as well as the stop payment of one of 
the checks injured a Utah corporation. These activities "affected persons or businesses within 
the State of Utah," as described by the SII Court. And just as in SII, this Court has jurisdiction 
over the defendant based on these factors. 969 P.2d at 435. RHB has transacted business in this 
state under the test followed in SII. Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendants' Motion. 
B. Jurisdiction in this Court Does not Violate RHB's Right to Due 
Process. 
In SII, the court held that defendants' conduct, as enumerated in the last section, 
amounted to "minimum contacts" for the purpose of giving the Utah court jurisdiction. Id 
Likewise, in the current dispute, this Court's assertion of jurisdiction over RHB does not violate 
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goods produced in Utah, shipped from Luh, invoiced in Utah, and by sending 
In SIL the court found that the defendant "purposefully availed itself of the benefits and 
protections of Utah law" by signing a'contract with a Utah corporation and commencing a 
regular course of business purchasing goods from that Utah corporation, Id.' The same is true in 
lllllin 1 inn ill 1 ii'-i H i l l iiiuiposHlilly
 rn t i lnl ill * f i f nf lln1 IN nrfjf , mil |ii 1 iili m (11 inr nl I I II ,il 1 I 1 
when it entered into a contract to purchase goods from Utah and received' goods s 
I Kill \ l ine , JS IK it 1 1I1 li lulriril 1 lull li 1 ihn 1 h d In 
residents seeks ' to defeat jurisdiction, he rnu>t present a cc mpell ing case that the oresence of 
some other considerations wo 11M render jurisdiction unreasonable " " .,_ „\ ^: \ i%r 
471 u . S . 477). RHB has presented no such evidence. Accordingly; D e f e n d a n t ' Motion sh-^^id 
be denied. 
C. RHB Has Expressly Consented to the Jurisdiction of this Court. 
The single most important fact surrounding any question of jurisdiction in this 
I , UTR signed a contract e xpressly consenting to the jurisdiction of this 
« !•*< M can " viii v reviewed the Contract and made cer ta in-changes before signing it. 
II \ l i i h i l II ||ii II II I I I I i i v m i f i r a i i l l v i l i l n l I illllci a m e n d r : - - p1 n -
to change the consent to the personal jurisdiction' of this Court K H B signed the L.ni 
Utah,, courts have upheld the principle set forth : Restaterr 
Conflict of Laws § 80 (1.989) that "[t]he parties agreement a: ; ... p.^'e ;j . . Se 
given effect "unless it is 'unfair.or unreasonable."' Phone Directories Co. Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 
TT 64. n 7, 8 P.3d 256. In Henderson, the court held that: 
• : = i v l
 U 
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[Wjhile a forum selection/consent-to-jurisdiction clause by itself is 
not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over a defendant as a 
matter of law, such clauses do create a presumption in favor of 
jurisdiction and will be upheld as fair and reasonable so long as 
there is a rational nexus between the forum selected and/or 
consented to, and either the parties to the contract or the 
transactions that are the subject matter of the contract. Although 
the rational nexus element does require some connection between 
Utah and either the parties to or actions contemplated by the 
contract, it need not rise to the level required under section 78-27-
24. 
7tf.at1[l4.4 
As explained above, there is a clear rationale nexus to this state in this dispute. 
RHB purchased products from Utah, made payment for those products in Utah, breached the 
Contract by refusing to tender timely payment in Utah, and communicated through mail and wire 
communications to Utah regarding the particulars of the conduct of business between the parties. 
Beyond that, it consented and agreed to adjudicate any disputes between the parties in Salt Lake 
City. (Exhibit B, p. 2, If 12). 
As the Henderson Court explained, "people are free to waive the requirement that 
a court must have personal jurisdiction over them before that court can adjudicate a case 
involving them." Id. at % 15 (citing National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 
315-16 (1964) (stating that "it is settled...that parties to a contract may agree in advance to 
submit to the jurisdiction of a given court"); Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co., 350 U.S. 495, 
495-96 (1956) (holding that parties who stipulated to personal jurisdiction waived any right to 
assert a lack of personal jurisdiction); Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(stating that "defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived")). Additionally, "people are 
4
 Defendants cite State ex rel W.A., 2002 UT 127, as authority setting forth the standard to be followed in 
deciding jurisdictional questions. Because that case did not involve an explicit consent to jurisdiction, as in the 
present case, it is inapplicable to a deteimination of the current dispute. 
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icct matter oi kv .; incapacity. Id. (ntmp Twin City Pipe Line Co.
 K. ^^ / ding Glass Co.,, 
-5* - - - . ^ -.* i) (""Ihe general i tile is that competent persons shall have the utmost 
liberty of contracting and that their agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall br lu M MII I 
and-enforced in the courts.")), "V Tien combined, these "two concepts support, the conclusion that 
people IMP contractually awn? to subr" ! 1ni ^ r iMrr.rW'hc" i ' \*v+i " h >
 M t u i I r l i ml 
might not have independent personal jurisdiction over them" under the general tests for 
detennining persona 1 j i i i isdictic n ! d. 
In so holding, the Henderson Court held that r had •nrisdiction over a California 
i esident • h :: ; ' 'as si ic :1 lb;; a' [ J tah :: :)i poi ation s itli its pr . ~ •_ ..; business in-Utah where 
the California resident telephoned the plaintiffs Utah offices to discuss the arrangement between 
the parties and where he mailed the contract between, the parties to the p la in t ; » offices. 
Id. at U'16. Likewise, in the present case, this Court has'jurisdiction over RHB for' 'the same 
reasons. 
RHB consented to this Court's jurisdiction and, therefore, Defendants1 Mullen I » 
Dismiss should be denied. 
| I I . RHB Accepted the Venue and Jurisdiction Pi\ 
Signing the Contract and by Accepting CAPCU ~ ™ »*^ „* ^v™* 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207. 
contractual!• u -r~v :i\ ibc ( ontract between CAPCO and RHB. i.wru *,, 
c .J.. i .* • • i .sdiction -w were 
accomplished b> •'! RHB'S signing of the Contract, and (2) RHB's acceptance of CAPCO's 
offer to sell gooes u- , H 3 . 
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It is clear from examination of the amended Contract attached as Exhibit B that 
RHB intended, and did in fact, agree to the forum selection clause contained in the Contract. As 
is evidenced by Exhibit B> RHB went to some lengths to amend the portions of the Contract. 
RHB made substantial, substantive revisions to paragraphs 4 and 11. However, even though 
RHB took the time and made the effort to carefully review and alter the Contract, RHB did not in 
any way attempt to amend paragraph 12. By signing this Contract, RHB agreed, at least, to the 
unaltered provisions, including the forum selection clause that places jurisdiction and venue of 
the claims brought in the Complaint with this Court. RHB has not, and indeed cannot, rationally 
object to its previous concession to this term of the signed Contract. 
Further, even without RHB's signature on the altered Contract, the forum 
selection clause in the Contract is valid and enforceable. This dispute is governed by the 
Uniform Commercial Code because it involves the sale of goods.5 Section 2-207 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code has been adopted by both Utah and Nevada. It provides: 
(1) A. definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written 
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an 
acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different 
from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly 
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms. 
Under this provision, CAPCO's Bid and Contract constituted the offer because 
they contained a "manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain" that was "definite in its 
terms5' so as to reasonably set forth the promises and performances of both parties. Weyburn-
Bartel, Inc. v. Zagar, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16988, *8 ( W.D.Mich. October 21, 1996). 
The Zagar Court specifically held that "a price quotation can amount to an offer giving rise to a 
Both Utah and Nevada have adopted, verbatim, the sections of the Uniform Commercial Code applicable to 
this dispute. Because the laws of the two states do not differ, neither state's laws will be cited, but rather, all 
citations will be to the Uniform Commercial Code. 
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so holding, the court found that the price quotation given by the seller constituted ihe wu^i 
because it contained all the material terms of the contract. 
In the current dispute, just as in Zagar, the seller's price quotatit r '" * * YVs Bid 
and Contract, set forth all of the material terms of the offer. Id The Bid and C 
responsibilities and performan i 
and Contract are;, therefore, the offer /!!l nd, just as in 'Zagar, the buyer's (RHB's) subsequent 
p j;.t- • '. -- --^ -*-on • ::: f ;i i ("|i!,inn. t nil illli.iill11 irlliii i \ "d, a "Ill:.' ' 13 ' In acceptii ig 
CAPCO's .conditional offer, RHB impliedly manifested assent to the forum selection- 'and 
v dictional clause in the Coiiti act. i d. 
Accordingly, since "RHB both explicitly and impliedly agreed to jurisdiction, in 
this Court, Defendants1" Motion should be dei'i 1 
I I ILUSION 
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DATED; December 19, 2 . 
BALi \- K- > 
Angela VMmams, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Crown Asphalt Products Co. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of December 2003,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF VENUE AND LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION to 
be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Barbara K. Berrett 
Mark D.Taylor 
Benrett & Associates, L.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Kay Bank Tower, Suite 530 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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K,„ .MPA1 1 ! ! : RULING ON DEPEN DANTS« 
ci uLdi. un, MOTION TO DISMISS 
Pl-.ir.i-..:, I 'i SE 1 " I" : 03 092246 9 
vs. 
: Judge Ann Boyden 
ROAD & HIGHWAY BUILDERS, L.L.C., 
a Nevada Limited Liability : 
Corporation, and LIBERTY MUTUA I 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a : 
Massachusetts Corporation, 
De .- ^ t* 
This Court has received and fully reviewed defendants1 Moti on 
t: : E):i si: :;„:t ss f c r ~ . . . n ; 
plaintiff's opposing Memorandum; defendants ' Reply, ~:~A 
accompanying Memoranda and Affidavits. All issues are well -?nd 
- - •-''-*:- i i L) I rX 1 j I f l t - ' I ' 
necessary r:. . assist, m e Court. 
The Court finds that the issues involved in this suit are so 
tight .] y :: DIII lected t = ti .• :: State : f Ne v ada, that di le process 
requirements and the interests of justice cannot be met by 
retaining the suit in this jurisdicti on For these reasons, and 
3 in: i ie.1 its set f :: r tl ' i 10: e fu] ] ;\, :i i i defendants r Motion 
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and Reply, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Defendants to 
prepare the Order. 
Dated this ) day of plffiSry, 2 004. 
44 
BOYDI 
ANN BOYDEN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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CROWN ASPHALT V. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I rr.ailed a true and correct copy c:. • he 
foregoing Ruling on Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss, * \e 
Jeffrey W. Shields 
Angela W. Adams 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
201 S. Main, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Barbara K. Berrett 
Mark D. Taylor 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 S. Main, Suite 530 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64101 
